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Compounding Vulnerability: Impacts of Climate Change on 
Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank  
 
 
MICHAEL MASON, MARK ZEITOUN and ZIAD MIMI 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the implications of climate change for Palestinians in the occupied 
Palestinian territory, through a focus on vulnerability pertaining to water provision and 
the agricultural sector. Climate vulnerability is understood as exposure to climate-related 
hazards in the context of social vulnerability. Climate models project, over the course of 
this century, increased mean temperatures and decreased rainfall for the Eastern 
Mediterranean, suggesting reduced freshwater availability and poorer food growing 
conditions. The coping mechanisms that Palestinians have already developed in the face 
of climate variability and the physical manifestations of the Israeli occupation would be 
strongly tested by the forecasted impacts of climate change. It is argued that, contrary to 
technical-managerial framings of climate risk, the Israeli occupation is constitutive of 
Palestinian climate vulnerability, eroding those living conditions and livelihoods already 
sensitive to water-related stresses. Israeli military and security practices impair existing 
coping mechanisms, force new ones, and generally compound the overall level of 
vulnerability to climate change. 
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Compounding Vulnerability: Impacts of Climate Change on 
Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank 
 
 
“It is within the context of occupation that Palestinians are particularly vulnerable to 
climate change… [and] face severe restrictions in terms of our capacity to adapt to 
climate change,” Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, Copenhagen, 16 
December 2009 
 
“We have to separate environment from politics… The Mediterranean requires a 
multilateral [environmental] taskforce independent of political disputes,” Israeli President 
Shimon Peres, Copenhagen, 17 December 2009 
 
In December 2009, the world’s media descended on Copenhagen to cover the fifteenth 
conference of the parties (COP15) of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). The negotiations, undertaken to produce a new climate 
agreement, were widely regarded as a failure in the light of the adoption of the non-
binding Copenhagen Accord. Yet the Accord did include acceptance of the scientific 
judgement of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that deep cuts in 
greenhouse gas emissions are required to hold projected increases in global mean 
temperature to 20C (compared to pre-industrial levels). Warming above 2 degrees is taken 
to be “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,”1 which Parties 
have an obligation to prevent under Article 2 of UNFCCC. There remain uncertainties 
about how much mean temperatures will rise is in relation to predicted greenhouse gas 
emissions and concentrations, but the IPCC confidently predicts further anthropogenic 
warming this century if emissions continue at or above current rates. 
 At the Copenhagen meeting 130 heads of state and government affirmed their 
commitments to address climate change, including Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime 
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Minister Salam Fayyad and Israeli President Shimon Peres. Observers hoping that shared 
climate risks would be an area for Palestinian-Israeli cooperation were to be 
disappointed. Both leaders acknowledged that significant climate change impacts were 
forecast by the end of this century for the Eastern Mediterranean region: these impacts, 
Fayyad noted, included decreased participation, significant warming, a tendency towards 
more extreme weather events, and a rise in sea-level.2 There was also a shared recognition 
that the key hazards posed by these changes–greater water scarcity, falling agricultural 
productivity, an increased probability of flashfloods and saline intrusion into 
groundwater–will be accentuated by a growing regional population. 
 There the commonality of concerns ended. “Carbon molecules carry no 
passport,” stated Peres,3 as he invited Israel’s neighbours–including the PA–onto a 
regional environmental taskforce to tackle climate change. Rejecting this offer, the 
Palestinian delegation stated that the inhabitants of Gaza and West Bank have long been 
denied such freedom of movement. Indeed, the Palestinians had only been granted 
limited access to COP15, as Observers, following lobbying by the Arab League and, in 
his statement at Copenhagen, Salam Fayyad highlighted the difficulties of representing a 
territory under occupation, whose full membership of UNFCCC could only come with 
the assumption of sovereign statehood. The frustrations of a contested Palestinian 
representative4 and the long-term impacts of climate change may be the last concern of 
Palestinians suffering the daily effects of political strife and conflict. Farmers living in 
Gaza who grow crops in brackish water only to see them barred from export markets do 
not have the luxury to consider climate change projections; nor do the herders in the 
southern Hebron hills routinely subject to settler violence. 
 But while climate change is not the most pressing issue for Palestinians in the 
West Bank and Gaza, the climate risks are significant and will compound the current 
hazards posed by the Israeli occupation. As confirmed by recent United Nations 
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Development Programme (UNDP) consultations on climate adaptation in the occupied 
Palestinian territory (oPt),5 the impacts of climate change on the livelihoods of most 
Palestinians pale in comparison with the effects of the Israeli occupation.6 The “climate 
vulnerability” approach employed in this article is a direct attempt to reconcile this 
tension between immediate living conditions and “external” climate impacts. It thus adds 
to the understanding of the effects of the occupation, as well as challenging those views–
such as the Israeli position at COP15–that claim it is possible to separate environmental 
issues from politics. We argue that the expected effects of climate change are likely to 
compound the negative effects of the occupation, primarily through impairing existing 
coping mechanisms or forcing new ones. We also discuss how the discourse around 
climate change affects not only Palestinian living conditions and livelihoods but also 
state-building efforts.  
 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND VULNERABILITY 
 
 In climate research, vulnerability is taken to mean the propensity of people or 
systems to be harmed by hazards or stresses, and is determined by “their exposures to 
hazard[s], their sensitivity to the exposures, and their capacities to resist, cope with, 
exploit, recover from and adapt to the effects.”7 There is a claim that climate change is 
altering exposures to climate-related hazards, understood as extreme weather events (e.g. 
flooding, extreme heat, droughts) which may trigger various societal shocks (e.g. falls in 
food productivity or population displacements). What the IPCC labels “key” 
vulnerabilities to climate change–those meriting policy attention as symptomatic of 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system–are seen to depend on the 
magnitude, timing and distribution of climate impacts.8 While early IPCC formulations 
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favored biophysical framings of climate impacts and ecosystem vulnerability, it is now 
recognized that vulnerability to climate change properly extends to the socio-economic 
and political conditions that affect how communities cope with the impacts of climate-
related hazards. This has led to a more integrated understanding of vulnerability, which is 
designed to capture the role of non-climatic pressures on individuals and groups who are 
also facing climate hazards.9 
 This broader perspective is in line with the definition adopted here, where climate  
vulnerability refers to the exposure to climate-related hazards in the context of social 
vulnerability, as well as in relation to response capabilities in both the short-term (coping 
with the effects) and long-term (adapting to the effects). We claim that, as is the case in 
many other contexts, climate vulnerability is less about changes in physical systems than 
the political-economic contexts in which “climate risk” is constructed and produced.10 
The substantive discussion below reports on climate vulnerability as the perceived risks 
of Palestinians to water-sensitive living conditions and livelihoods in Gaza and the West 
Bank, with forecasted climate impacts expected to compound the harmful ecological 
effects of occupation. 
 Coping with, or adapting to, “climate risks” must be seen in the context of 
political-economic settings. Alongside other countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa, the oPt faces significant reductions in water availability as a result of climate 
change. Yet there are major differences in regional adaptive capacity relating to 
institutional structures and resources. For example, Egypt has reduced river flow 
variability through the construction of the High Aswan Dam; while oil rents in the Gulf 
states have enabled them to overcome physical water scarcity though heavy investments 
in seawater desalination. Rich Arab countries may also overcome physical water scarcity, 
which can threaten food security, by importing food–and the water used in its 
production (“virtual water”).11 Poorer Middle Eastern states less integrated into the 
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global economy have fewer such policy options available to develop their adaptive 
capacity in the face of forecasted climate change. For the oPt that adaptation space is 
even more restricted. 
 
Climate vulnerability in the occupied Palestinian territory 
 The construction of climate vulnerability in the oPt has been donor driven, led by 
the UNDP (New York) headquarters as part of its worldwide Adaptation Programme 
assisting poorer countries in their responses to climate change. Since 2008, the UNDP 
Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People (UNDP/PAPP) has funded PA 
capacity-building for climate adaptation, which in 2010 resulted both in the publication 
of a Climate Adaptation Strategy and Programme of Action for the Palestinian Authority and, by 
Cabinet decision, the creation of a Palestinian national committee on climate change.12 
This is a significant shift in political attention given that climate change was not 
mentioned in the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008-10 and, until the creation of 
the national climate committee, had not been considered as a policy challenge by the 
Palestinian Water Authority and Ministry of Agriculture. The UNDP-funded climate 
change initiative was designed to assist the Environmental Quality Authority, as lead PA 
agency on environmental protection, develop the institutional capacity to assess and 
manage climate risks. In so doing, UNDP headquarters promoted a technical-managerial 
framing of climate vulnerability, which–at least in the oPt–clashed with the conflict-laden 
experiences of governmental, NGO representatives and even UNDP/PAPP staff during 
the “stakeholder” consultations on climate change adaptation. 
 This technical-managerial notion of climate vulnerability rested, firstly, on the 
uncritical adoption of scientific projections from global and regional climate models, 
reading off climate risks from simulated environmental changes. Such projections carry 
international scientific authority, even when acknowledging simplifying assumptions and 
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uncertainties, and feature stark scenarios for the Eastern Mediterranean. The IPCC 
predicts that warming for the Southern Europe and Mediterranean over the 21st century 
will be greater than global annual mean warming-between 2.2 and 5.10C according to a 
credible emissions scenario. Annual mean precipitation is deemed “very likely” to drop in 
the Mediterranean-decreasing between -4 and -27% with an increased risk of summer 
drought.13 Climate projections to 2100 derived from higher-resolution regional climate 
models applied to the Eastern Mediterranean generally confirm IPCC predictions, with 
temperature rises of 3.50C to 4.80C and decreasing winter participation up to 35%. They 
also identify a tendency towards more extreme weather events, including a greater 
number of heat waves and heavier spring storms, though there is more uncertainty here 
than with temperature and precipitation projections.14 Lastly, sea levels in the Eastern 
Mediterranean are forecast by Israeli scientists to rise by 10cm every decade, which is 
consistent with global estimates of a 0.6-1.6m increase by the end of the century.15 There 
is some scientific research claiming already to have identified warming and increasing 
aridity in Israel and the oPt.16 However, regional climate model simulations have failed to 
reflect significant environmental variations within the oPt, even though these were used 
to generate the climate impact forecasts employed in the UNDP consultations on 
Palestinian climate vulnerability.17 
 Secondly, the UNDP construction of climate vulnerability in the oPt highlighted 
climate risks as a humanitarian threat, placing them within the policy realm of disaster 
risk management and emergency response operations. Current high levels of food and 
water insecurity in Gaza and the West Bank are forecast to be exacerbated by climate 
change, on account of worsening food growing conditions (the agricultural sector 
consumes over two-thirds of water abstracted or flowing from springs in the oPt) and a 
fragile water supply infrastructure.18 Combining population growth forecasts and regional 
climate change projections, it has been estimated that the oPt will experience a water 
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deficit of 271 million cubic meters a year by 2020.19 Given limited institutional capacity 
for disaster risk reduction in the PA, representing climate vulnerability as a humanitarian 
concern sustains the “emergency imaginary” of chronic human insecurity in the oPt-one 
that reproduces the dependence of the population on substantial flows of international 
assistance and, at the same time, the interventions of external actors.20 Indeed, there is 
increasing interest from donors in financing climate change adaptation and mitigation 
activities in the oPt: the donor lead on climate change taken by UNDP is significant here 
as the agency serves as one of the main conduits for bilateral and multilateral aid 
allocated to Gaza and the West Bank. 
 Thirdly, UNDP’s commitment to capacity-building for the PA has also 
reinforced a technical-managerial framing of climate vulnerability. Developing Palestinian 
administrative capacity for climate risk management has become another opportunity to 
inculcate “good governance” norms into the PA supportive of the Quartet agenda; that 
is, the existence of a Palestinian national authority co-existing peacefully with Israel while 
embracing democratic governance and market liberalism.21 While represented as 
consistent with UN principles of impartiality and neutrality, the political character of this 
state-building work was soon evident from the UNDP climate initiative, with Hamas 
governmental representatives not invited to stakeholder consultations, including 
meetings in the Gaza Strip. Since the Second Intifada, international support for Palestinian 
governance institutions has reflected US and European interests in fostering a compliant 
PA at the same time as undermining “rejectionist” groups, including Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad.22 If the reconciliation pact signed in May 2011 by Fatah and Hamas representatives 
has now upset this strategy, the Oslo-born PA is still regarded by most of the 
international community as the sole legitimate political authority for the Palestinian 
people. The attendance of Prime Minister Fayyad at the Copenhagen climate conference, 
alongside Palestinian participation in subsequent UNFCCC meetings, indicates an 
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awareness that the exercise of regulatory authority on climate change is another useful 
signal to external audiences that the PA is a governmental body ready to assume 
sovereign powers.  
 In its climate initiative for the PA, UNDP represented Palestinian climate 
vulnerability as largely a technical-administrative challenge in the management of 
ecological risks-notably the increased risk of drought and water scarcity in relation to 
agricultural livelihoods and public health. However, a series of consultations and 
workshops conducted by the UN agency between November 2008 and August 2009 in 
the oPt soon made this “post-conflict” framing untenable. Feedback from governmental 
officials, scientists and NGO representatives identified occupation-related conditions as 
constitutive of the vulnerability of Palestinians to climate variability and change. Above 
all, these conditions relate to the appropriation of Palestinian water and land resources by 
Israel; for example, most of the best agricultural land in the Jordan River Valley is taken 
by Israeli settlements, while over a third of arable land in Gaza is effectively not 
accessible to farmers because it falls within IDF-declared “no-go” and “high-risk” zones 
adjoining the border.23 Similarly, the terms and procedures of the “Oslo II” Agreement 
effectively prevent bulk water imports of clean water into the Gaza Strip and the full 
development of irrigation in the West Bank. The discussion below sets out the 
trajectories of climate vulnerability mapped out at meetings in Gaza and the West Bank, 
as well as the coping strategies currently employed by Palestinians to address existing 
shortfalls in water and food availability. 
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VULNERABILITY PATHWAYS AND COPING STRATEGIES IN GAZA AND 
THE WEST BANK 
 
Vulnerability pathways in the Gaza Strip 
 The UNDP climate change consultations conducted in Gaza in 2008/9 revealed 
a strong consensus among participants that its inhabitants as a whole have high climate 
vulnerability, though some communities are particularly exposed to climate-related hazards; 
e.g. residents of Jabalya and Khan Younis, due to recent storm water overflows, and 
residents of inland low lands, including neighbourhoods of Gaza City.24 This view 
reflects the exposure of the population to multiple biophysical hazards and, despite a 
wide array of coping mechanisms, its low capacity to adapt over the long-term to the 
Israeli sanctions and blockade. The pathways of climate vulnerability identified by 
Palestinians in Gaza through the UNDP consultations are shown in Figure 1. 
Highlighted above all is the dominant role of the Israeli blockade (represented most 
often in the consultations as a “siege”) in co-producing vulnerability to climate risks: its 
direct and indirect effects were seen by stakeholders as significantly eroding conditions of 
public health and rural livelihood opportunities. 
 The left-hand side of Figure 1 reveals the impact of the blockade on land and 
water resources, including restrictions to off-shore fishing limits. Since December 2008 
Israel has imposed a sea-border on Gaza of three nautical miles, severely impacting 
fishermen and reducing the fish catch in the Gaza Strip from 15,000 tons a month in 
2000 to 15-20 tons a month in 2010.25 Food insecurity is further compromised by 
barriers to external markets. The blockade has also cut off major sources of income from 
produce (generally strawberries, oranges and cut flowers) destined for Israel, Egypt or 
Europe. 
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 The effects of the blockade on wastewater treatment is yet another conflict-
related source of climate vulnerability. Untreated or partially treated wastewater 
(including the “sewage lakes” of the Northern Treatment Plant in Beit Lahiya and the 
rapidly growing raw sewage outflows around Khan Younis and Rafah) seep into the 
groundwater, further increasing nitrate and chloride levels, with associated health 
concerns.26 This vulnerability is accentuated by Israeli military assaults, including the 
legacy of Occupation Cast Lead, which resulted in serious damage or destruction to 203 
registered agricultural wells and four drilling wells, alongside damage to over 19,000 
meters of water pipes. Furthermore, a direct hit to the embankment wall of the Az 
Zaitoun wastewater treatment plant caused a sewage spillage affecting 55,000 square 
meters of agricultural land.27 
 
Figure 1: Climate Vulnerability Pathways in the Gaza Strip.28 
 
[FIGURE 1 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
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 The current vulnerability of the residents of the Gaza Strip to the ecological ill-
effects of conflict is compounded by expected longer-term risks of climate change set 
out on the right-hand side of Figure 1. Projected higher rainfall variability and decreases 
in precipitation were judged as threats to yields for rainfed agriculture and an additional 
strain on stressed groundwater resources. Increased temperatures are expected to 
accentuate this, because of greater groundwater pumping under conditions of increased 
evapotranspiration and desertification (particularly in the south).  
 The effects of worsening water quality reach even further. Israeli and Palestinian 
over-pumping of the coastal aquifer has been occurring for decades. The “sustainable 
limit” of the Coastal Aquifer has been estimated at 350 MCM/y, of which the Gazan 
portion is roughly 55 MCM/y.29 Total pumping within the Gaza Strip in 2008 is 
estimated from roughly 100-170 MCM/y.30 Not accounting for return flows, this means 
that the Gazan portion of the aquifer is already being over-drawn two to three times its 
sustainable limit. With the additional water stresses predicted from climate change and 
rapid population growth, the existing need for alternative water sources (e.g. significant 
transfers from southern Israel and/or a major desalination plant in Gaza) becomes even 
more pressing. 
 Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip already suffer the effects of severe water 
quality issues, the scale of which is difficult to exaggerate.31 Due primarily to its 
permeable and sandy cover, the transboundary coastal aquifer supplying groundwater to 
the Gaza Strip has a significant “intrinsic vulnerability” to pollution.32 Projected climate 
change-induced reductions in precipitation would exacerbate groundwater salinity levels 
through reduced soil flushing and groundwater recharge, while reductions in air moisture 
increase the soil water requirement of crops. Additional saline contamination of 
groundwater is expected with projected sea-level rise, compounding “natural” sources of 
salinization.33  
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Community and household coping mechanisms in Gaza 
 A number of coping mechanisms have been developed by the residents of Gaza 
in response to climate vulnerability. In some cases, these mechanisms are impaired by the 
Israeli occupation: other coping mechanisms are less by choice than imposed by extreme 
conditions of life. In the most extreme cases, coping mechanisms develop and, as with 
the smuggling under the border with Egypt, ingenuity can be perceived as criminal 
activity. Whether impaired or enforced, these coping mechanisms carry their own risks, 
and may serve to perpetuate climate vulnerability. 
 An example of impaired coping comes from the wastewater dilemma–to send it 
to the sea, or to let it percolate into the groundwater. Under more “normal” conditions, 
the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) and the Coastal Municipalities Water Utility 
(CMWU) would carry out an emergency upgrade to the Beit Lahiya wastewater treatment 
plant, while sending the sewage temporarily into the sea in order to avoid a grave public 
health risk. As both these options have been closed down by the Israeli blockade, the 
resource managers “cope” by shoring up the bank of the reservoir, thereby protecting the 
residents living on the edge, but letting the sewage contaminate the freshwater aquifer. 
 The development of private-sector water treatment plants exemplifies an 
“enforced” coping mechanism. In Gaza the increasingly poor drinking water quality has 
led to increased purchase of desalinated water from neighborhood-level reverse osmosis 
vendors, or the purchase of under-the-sink water filtration units. Both coping 
mechanisms contribute to the ever-greater share of household income spent on basic 
services, at least for those who can afford the option.34 The quality of the water sold by 
the neighborhood vendors is not regulated and never tested. Contamination is very likely 
either at the source (because of poor maintenance) or during transportation 
(contaminants entering the jerry-cans and buckets used to transport the water). Even the 
water produced by the household filtration units remains biologically contaminated for 
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lack of proper maintenance. The PWA and CMWU have responded in turn by mixing 
sources of safe and unsafe water to increase drinking water availability at a marginally 
safer quality level. By notifying the residents when it supplies safe water (from a less 
polluted source) and when it supplies unsafe water–which may still safely be used for 
washing–the overall coping ability of the community is increased. But the resilience of 
such enforced coping mechanisms in the long-term is, at best, precarious. 
 While other coping mechanisms are more benign, their contribution to long-term 
adaptive capacity may not be. Coping with the water crisis in the agricultural sector is 
becoming evident through the selection of less water-intensive and more salt-resistant 
crops, such as dates. This practice is in fact a return to tradition, as water-intensive citrus 
production originated from the period of Israeli settlement in Gaza. Similarly, the lack of 
stock fertilizers on the market has led to farmers rediscovering organic methods (as well 
as the use of partially-treated wastewater). The piloting of solar food-drying techniques 
has resulted from shortages in cooking gas.35 Yet if the worst-case climate change 
scenarios were to develop, with increased crop water requirements and decreased water 
quality and availability, such “benign” coping mechanisms may prove insufficient to 
sustain farming livelihoods. With that threshold breached, a new set of vulnerabilities 
may have to be faced, such as prospects for alternative livelihoods in an economy 
prevented from trading with the world. 
 
Vulnerability pathways in the West Bank 
 As in the case of Gaza, living conditions and livelihoods in the West Bank are 
impacted by both the biophysical and political-economic co-production of climate 
vulnerability–specifically risks associated with decreased (and more variable) precipitation 
and risks associated with various aspects of the Israeli occupation. Given its large 
utilization of available water resources and importance as the key source of rural 
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livelihoods, agriculture is again the sector most sensitive to climate variability and change, 
particularly in the Governorates of Jenin and Tulkarem, and along the Jordan River 
Valley. This sensitivity is heightened by a reliance on rain-fed agriculture–94% of (non-
settlement) arable agricultural land (166,000 ha) is ran-fed, with about two-thirds of this 
taken up by fruit trees (olives, citrus, grapes) and field crops accounting for most of the 
rest. While olive and some citrus trees are relatively resilient (and can tolerate several 
drier-than-usual seasons), yields of wheat and fodder crops are very sensitive to rainfall.36  
 Groundwater, stored in aquifers and accessed primarily through wells, is by far 
the main source of water for the West Bank. Each of the three aquifers lying under the 
West Bank are transboundary with Israel. There is high variability in the recharge rates 
and sustainable yields of these aquifers, but the terms of Article 40 of the “Oslo II” 
Agreement dictate that Palestinians limit their abstraction to 20% of the estimated 
renewable potential. Debates are fierce over whether the estimated potential reflects 
actual sustainable yields. Israeli abstractions from 1995 to 2003 regularly exceeded the 
treaty- (80%) or physical limit (on average 72 MCM/y over the Oslo-II allocated 
abstraction).37 The terms of this agreement also prevent any Palestinian drilling from the 
preferred aquifer basin (in terms of quality, quantity, and abstraction costs), and subjects 
drilling plans in the other basins to Israeli approval through the Joint Water Committee.38 
 With groundwater resources in the West Bank abstracted at or beyond their 
sustainable limits, regional projections for climate change-induced precipitation decline 
and warming will, if accurate, exacerbate water quantity and quality stresses. Recent 
Palestinian research forecasts significant falls in aquifer recharge volumes and increased 
water salinization as a result of climate change, though with significant uncertainty 
attached.39  
 The stakeholder consultations on climate vulnerability undertaken by UNDP in 
the West Bank revealed agreement on reduced rainfall as the most important climate risk 
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to rural livelihoods. This is shown on the right-hand side of Figure 2 by the various 
negative effects of reduced precipitation on groundwater supply and agricultural yields. 
Apart from reduced aquifer recharge rates, decreased rainfall is projected to lead to lower 
soil moisture, lower supply of water from Israel, less spring flow, and increased 
groundwater salinization. The lower agricultural yields associated with these changes are 
forecast to impact negatively on agricultural livelihoods, either directly through reduced 
incomes or indirectly though an expected loss of land ownership from leaving fields 
unplanted for three years (a Israeli land appropriation practice, enabled by an Ottoman-
era law, discriminately applied in the West Bank). 
 Figure 2 also shows how a higher variability in precipitation as a result of climate 
change is expected to impact on agricultural yields and associated livelihoods in the West 
Bank. The altered intensity of rainfall and duration of growing seasons would have a 
number of major impacts. Firstly, periods of heavier rainfall will be concentrated in a 
shorter time, with consequent increased run-off and erosion from stormwater floods. 
Less water retained in the soil will result in lower pasture production, forcing farmers and 
herders to purchase (more) fodder. Secondly, reduced rainfall will result in a lower 
quantity of water harvested and stored in cisterns, impacting negatively on agricultural 
productivity. The altered growing season further puts crops (and yields) at risk, as seeds 
sown generally in the autumn in anticipation of late November rains risk spoiling if the 
rains are delayed to January. 
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Figure 2: Climate Vulnerability Pathways in the West Bank.40 
 
[FIGURE 2 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 It is also possible that increases in seasonal temperature variability and the 
frequency of temperature extremes may endanger cold- and heat-sensitive crops. 
Drought damage is expected to increase with reduced water availability, hotter 
temperatures and shorter winters. Under such conditions, more pests and pathogens will 
not only increase crop diseases but also their sensitivity to drought, and loss of 
biodiversity may reduce the natural control of agricultural pests. A delayed growing 
season would also cause the Palestinian agricultural sector to lose its advantage over 
countries in colder climates as an early exporter of flowers, fruits and vegetables. 
 The physical stress on water resources induced by climate variability and change 
in the West Bank is compounded by the Israeli occupation, as highlighted on the left-
hand side of Figure 2. The diverse effects lead to more precarious livelihoods as well as 
increased tensions between communities, Palestinian ministries and Israeli authorities. 
  Page 18 of 25 
 
The numerous access and movement restrictions arising from the separation barrier, 
expanding settlements, and Israeli settler/military roads significantly impair agricultural 
activity. Palestinian farmers are prevented from gaining regular access to their lands 
and/or to markets, impacting directly on yields and rural livelihoods. Unchecked settler 
violence against Palestinian civilians and property (including crops and water 
infrastructure) constitutes also a routine impact of the occupation on rural Palestinian 
communities.41 Indeed, the potential for longer-term adaptation strategies is also 
compromised by Israeli occupational practices: for example, the restrictions imposed by 
the Separation Wall on Palestinian wells have significantly reduced availability of 
agricultural water for the northern West Bank.42 
 
Community and household coping mechanisms in the West Bank 
 Palestinians in the West Bank have developed a number of mechanisms to cope 
with the climate vulnerability they experience. At least from the time of Ottoman rule, 
sedentary farmers and Bedouins in the southern Hebron region have effectively adapted 
to periods of drought by shifting between livestock breeding and small-scale farming. 
That the Hebron Governorate still includes both the largest area in the oPt for barley 
cultivation and the highest concentration of farm animals suggests a continuing adaptive 
coordination between agricultural subsectors in response to varied conditions of food 
production. Historical adaptation to climatic hazards and other pressures on livelihoods 
is evident historically from the extensive remains of the khirab (temporary villages) in the 
region–where land was not cultivated until environmental and market conditions were 
favorable. Until recently, it also remained common for rural incomes to be supplemented 
by family members gaining seasonal employment in nearby cities in the West Bank (e.g. 
the glass industry in Hebron) or in Israel. However, since the outset of the Second Intifada 
in 2000, Israeli work permits have become very difficult to obtain for Palestinians, and 
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income from traditional coping mechanisms has dried up. Many in the Hebron 
Governorate have turned to breeding small ruminants breeding to cope economically. 
Herd sizes have increased significantly in the past ten years, increasing human pressures 
on climate-stressed rangeland, triggering a vicious cycle of overgrazing and land 
degradation.43 
 In the northern govenorate of Tubas, which is economically dependent on 
agriculture, repeated drought periods have reduced springflow, limiting the time farmers 
have for irrigating their crops, and for producing second or third yearly harvests. As in 
the south of the Hebron Governorate, half the population of the Tubas Governorate is 
not connected to the Palestinian water network, making them dependent on rainwater 
harvesting, cisterns and tankers. Israeli movement restrictions block access to agricultural 
land for several villages in the region (e.g. around Al-Bikai'a). As with other Palestinian 
villages in Area C, these controls also mean that rural communities typically pay higher 
prices and suffer poorer water quality than would otherwise be the case.44 
 Short-term coping mechanisms and long-term adaptation strategies alike are 
impaired in the Jordan River Valley. Dry years have also resulted in freshwater cuts from 
the Israeli water supplier Mekorot to southern regions of the Jordan River Valley (as was 
the case in 2008 also for domestic consumers in Israel), thereby limiting the number of 
harvests. These communities have had access to the rich farmlands adjoining the Jordan 
River blocked, or taken by settlements (approximately 27,000 dunums used by 7,000 
settlers in 2006, compared with 53,000 dunums used by 47,000 Palestinians).45 Compared 
to the effects of Israeli occupation practices, climate-induced water scarcity is negligible. 
It has been suggested that Israeli deep well extraction (for settlements) from the Eastern 
Aquifer has reduced groundwater levels, seriously impacting Palestinian springs and 
wells: less than 90 of the 184 agricultural wells in the Jordan River Valley are currently 
functioning.46 There are signs that farmers are attempting to adapt to conditions of 
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greater water scarcity–for example, moving away from banana and citrus crops in the 
irrigated lands around Jericho–but movement restrictions prevent reliable and cost-
effective access to external markets for alternative cash crops (e.g. eggplants, tomatoes, 
squash, maize) as well as livestock and diary products  
 Traditional forms of household and community coping in the face of adversity 
offer rural models for Palestinian adaptation to climate change, but the ongoing effects 
of the Israeli occupation undermine the market conditions necessary to their operation–
the free movement of goods and people–perpetuating the “de-development” of 
Palestinian economic and institutional capacity.47 To be sure, Palestinian households and 
communities have had to cope with problems not directly linked to Israeli government 
policy–e.g. a financial crisis in the PA, fluctuations in food and fuel prices–but the 
absence of effective control of their natural resources is constitutive of the climate 
vulnerability of West Bank Palestinians. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The idea that Palestinians are vulnerable to climate change is largely the product 
of a donor agenda, which fused international concern over “dangerous” climate change 
with the emergency imaginary of chronic human insecurity in the oPt. Both the 
environmental and humanitarian discourses deployed here are authoritative: from climate 
modelling applied to the Eastern Mediterranean, climate scientists concur that projected 
warming is highly likely to cause hazardous biophysical impacts across the region, 
including Gaza and the West Bank; and unequivocal evidence on current food and water 
scarcity in the oPt provides (further) support for those who speak of a Palestinian 
humanitarian crisis. It is not surprising that agricultural livelihoods feature at the 
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convergence of these two discourses, as the agricultural sector consumes two-thirds of 
withdrawn water in the oPt and is sensitive to significant shifts in temperature and 
precipitation. Thus, the UNDP climate adaptation initiative for the PA focused on food- 
and water-related stresses in its construction of climate vulnerability pathways for Gaza 
and the West Bank. 
 For the UNDP, climate vulnerability was gauged by gathering “stakeholder” 
input on scientifically-derived climate projections, with a view to informing, and 
legitimizing, climate adaptation policy proposals for the PA. Developing climate 
governance capacity therefore became part of a state-building process anticipating a 
“post-conflict” future in which the PA assumes sovereign control of some Palestinian 
territory in Gaza and the West Bank. As noted above, this technical-managerial framing 
was disrupted by the insistence of stakeholders in Gaza and the West Bank that the 
Israeli occupation is constitutive of the vulnerability of Palestinians to climate risk. 
Whether for security or settlement purposes, Israeli appropriation and degradation of 
environmental resources in the oPt is by far the most immediate, as well as enduring, 
threat to Palestinian living conditions and livelihoods. The UNDP climate consultations 
also highlighted how Israeli military and security practices significantly weaken the 
capacity of Palestinians to cope with, and adapt to, climate risks. 
 Contrary to technical-managerial representations, climate change impacts in the 
oPt are inherently politicized, and it makes little sense to develop “post-conflict” climate 
impact assessments or governance institutions for the Palestinians without an end to the 
occupation. Indeed, some claim that the existing conflict could be exacerbated by climate 
change as asymmetries in per capita water between the oPt and Israel are accentuated.48 
Such claims are overblown: by itself water scarcity is not a robust predictor of violent 
conflict as virtual water and new water (e.g. seawater desalination and treated wastewater) 
can enhance adaptation to climate-induced water stresses. However, Palestinian calls for 
  Page 22 of 25 
 
equitable access to transboundary waters remain central to their aspirations for resource 
sovereignty. On this issue, it is instructive that, should serious final status negotiations 
resume, Israeli negotiators have cited forecasted climate change impacts as justification 
for opposing any reallocation to the Palestinians of shared groundwater supplies. Such a 
stance exposes as disingenuous the content and intent of the Israeli Prime Minister’s call 
for regional cooperation over climate change. 
 23 
 
                                                 
 1 UNFCCC, Decision 2/CP.15: Copenhagen Accord. New York: United Nations, Document 
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, p. 5, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf#page=4 
(accessed April 12, 2010). “Climate change” in this article means “a change of climate which is attributed 
directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere which is in 
addition to the natural climate variability observed over comparative time periods” (UNFCCC Article 
1.2). 
 2 Mr. Salam Fayyad, Address to UNFCCC COP15, Copenhagen, 16 December 2009, 
http://unfccc2.metafusion.com/kongresse/cop15_hls/templ/play.php?id_kongresssession=4150 
(accessed April 12, 2010). 
 3 Mr. Shimon Peres, Address to UNFCCC COP15, Copenhagen, 17 December 2009, 
http://unfccc2.metafusion.com/kongresse/cop15_hls/templ/play.php?id_kongresssession=4164 
(accessed April 12, 2010). 
 4 As Fayyad’s appointment as Prime Minister of an “emergency government” was not approved 
by the Legislative Council, its constitutional legitimacy is questionable and contested by the Hamas 
Government in Gaza and other parties. 
 5 Our use of the term “occupied Palestinian territory” follows the current nomenclature 
employed by the United Nations, including UN agencies working in Gaza and the West Bank. Unless 
otherwise specified, the use of the term “Palestinian” here refers to Palestinians living in the oPt. 
 6 UNDP, Climate Adaptation Strategy and Programme of Action for the Palestinian Authority (Jerusalem: 
UNDP/PAPP, 2010). 
 7 Neil Leary and others, “For Whom the Bell Tolls: Vulnerabilities in a Changing Climate,” in 
Climate Change and Vulnerability, ed. Neil Leary and others (London: Eathscan, 2008), p. 4. 
 8 Stephen H. Schneider and others, “Assessing Key Vulnerabilities and the Risk from 
Climate Change.” In Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. M.L. Parry and others (Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press, 2007), p. 784. 
 9 W. Neil Adger, “Vulnerability,” Global Environmental Change, 16, no. 3 (2006): pp. 269-281;  
Anthony G. Pratt and others, “Vulnerability Research and Assessment to Support Adaptation and  
Mitigation: Common Themes from the Diversity of Approaches,” in Assessing Vulnerability to Climate  
Change, ed. A.G. Patt and others (London: Earthscan, 2009), pp. 1-25. 
 10 David Demeritt, “The Construction of Global Warming and the Politics of Science”, Annals of 
the Association of American Geographers 91, no. 2 (2001), p. 307-337; Mary E. Petenger, ed., The Social 
Construction of Climate Change (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007); Mike Hulme, Why We Disagree about Climate 
Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction and Opportunity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
 11 Tony Allan refers to the role that this virtual water plays as “economically invisible and 
politically silent:” Tony Allan, “Energy and Water: Interdependent Production and Use, the Remediation 
of Local Scarcity and the Mutuality of the Impacts of Mismanagement,” in Renewable Energy in the Middle 
East, ed. Michael Mason and Amit Mor (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), p. 202. 
 12 UNDP, Climate Adaptation Strategy and Programme of Action for the Palestinian Authority (Jerusalem, 
UNDP, 2010). The first meeting of the Palestinian national climate committee was held on 24th August 
2010. 
 13 Jens H. Christensen, Bruce Hewitson and others, “Regional Climate Predictions”. In Climate 
Change 2007: the Physical Science Basis. The Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. S. Solomon and others (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), p. 854. 
 14 See especially: Akio Kitoh and others, “First Super-High-Resolution Model Projection that the 
Ancient ‘Fertile Crescent’ Will Disappear in This Century,” Hydrological Research Letters 44 (2008), pp. 1-4; 
Samuel Somot and others, “21st Century Climate Scenario for the Mediterranean Using a Coupled 
Atmosphere-Ocean Regional Climate Model”, Global and Planetary Change 63, nos. 1-2 (2008), pp. 112-26; 
Imad Khatib and others, GLOWA-Jordan River–Project 3 Final Report: Regional Climate Scenarios (Jerusalem: 
Palestine Academy for Science & Technology, 2009), Debbie Hemmings and others, “How Uncertain are 
Climate Model Projections of Water Availability Indicators Across the Middle East?”, Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society 368 (2010), pp. 5117-35. 
 24 
                                                                                                                                                        
 15 Office of the Chief Scientist, Preparation of Israel for Global Climate Change: The Consequences of 
Climate Change in Israel and Interim Recommendations [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Environmental 
Protection, 2008); Svetlana Jevrejeva and others, “How Will Sea Level Respond to Changes in Natural 
and Anthropogenic Forcings by 2100?” Geophysical Research Letters 37 (2007), L07703. 
 16 Ahmed El-Kadi, “Global Warming: A Study of the Gaza Temperature Variations in the Period 
1976-1995,” Islamic University Magazine 13, no. 2 (2005), pp. 1-19; Simon O. Krichak and others, “The 
Surface Climatology of the Eastern Mediterranean Region Obtained in a Three Member Ensemble 
Climate Change Simulation Experiment,” Advances in Geosciences 12, (2007), pp. 67-80; Hemu Kharel Kafle 
and Hendrik J. Bruins, “Climatic Trends in Israel 1970-2002: Warmer and Increasing Aridity Inland,” 
Climatic Change 96, no. 1 (2009), pp. 63-77. 
 17 UNDP, Climate Adaptation Strategy and Programme of Action for the Palestinian Authority, pp.9-13. 
 18 UNDP, Climate Adaptation Strategy and Programme of Action for the Palestinian Authority, pp. 32-36. 
 19 Ziad Mimi, Mohamed Ziara, and Hani Nigim, “Water Conservation and its Perception in 
Palestine: A Case Study,” Water and Environmental Management Journal 17, no.3 (2003), pp. 152-156. For 
alternative scenarios see Jonathan Lautze and Paul Kirshen, “Water Allocation, Climate Change, and 
Sustainable Water Use in Israel/Palestine: the Palestinian Position,” Water International 34, no. 2 (2009), 
pp. 189-203. 
 20 Anne Le More, International Assistance to the Palestinians After Oslo: Political Guilt, Wasted Money 
(London: Routledge, 2008); Sahar Taghdisi-Rad, The Political Economy of Aid in Palestine: Relief from Conflict or 
Development Delayed? (London: Routledge, 2011). The term “emergency imaginary” is from Craig Calhoun, 
“A World of Emergencies: Fear, Intervention, and the Limits of Cosmopolitan Order,” Canadian Review of 
Sociology, 41, no. 4 (2004), pp. 373-395. 
 21 Mushtaq Khan, ed., State Formation in Palestine: Viability and Governance During a Social 
Transformation (London: Routledge, 2004). 
 22 See, for example, Military Liaison Officer Jerusalem (2003) Palestinian Security Plan (Jerusalem: 
British Consulate General); Dag Tuastad, “The Role of International Clientelism in the National 
Factionalism of Palestine,” Third World Quarterly 31, no. 5 (2010), pp. 791-802. 
 23 B’Tselem, Dispossession and Exploitation: Israel’s Policy in the Jordan Valley and Northern Dead Sea 
(Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 2011) 
http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files/201105_dispossession_and_exploitation_eng.pdf (accessed 
May 11, 2011); OCHA-WFP, Between the Fence and a Hard Place: The Humanitarian Impact of Israeli-imposed 
Restrictions on Access to Land and Sea in the Gaza Strip (Jerusalem: OCHA-WFP, 2010), p. 10. 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_special_focus_2010_08_19_english.pdf (accessed April 
7, 2010).  
 24 UNDP, Climate Adaptation Strategy and Programme of Action for the Palestinian Authority, pp. 30-32. 
 25 OCHA-WFP, Between the Fence and a Hard Place, pp. 24-25.  
 26 Rajaie Batniji and others, “Health as Human Security in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” 
The Lancet 373 (2009), p. 1133. 
 27 UNEP, Environmental Assessment of the Gaza Strip (Geneva: UNEP, 2009), pp. 34-44. 
http://www.unep.org/PDF/dmb/UNEP_Gaza_EA.pdf (accessed April 7, 2010). 
 28 UNDP, Climate Adaptation Strategy and Programme of Action for the Palestinian Authority, p. 36. 
 29 Ahmad Yacoubi, Gaza Strip: Sustainable Yield of the Coastal Aquifer. Unpublished report. (Gaza 
City: PWA, 2008).  
 30 World Bank, West Bank and Gaza: Assessment of Restrictions on Palestinian Water Sector Development 
Sector Note, Middle East and North Africa Region - Sustainable Development. Report No. 47657-GZ 
(Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2009), p. 27; Palestinian 
Water Authority, The Gaza Emergency Technical Assistance Programme (GETAP) on Water Supply to the Gaza 
Strip: Component 1 - The Comparative Study of Options for an Additional Supply of Water for the Gaza Strip 
(Ramallah: PWA, 2011). 
 31 World Bank, West Bank and Gaza: Assessment of Restrictions on Palestinian Water Sector Development 
Sector Note, pp. 27-32. See also Palestinian Water Authority, Agricultural and Municipal Water Demand in Gaza 
Governorates for 2008 (Gaza City, PWA, 2009). 
 32 Mohammad N. Almasri, “Assessment of Intrinsic Vulnerability to Contamination for Gaza 
Coastal Aquifer, Palestine,” Journal of Environmental Management 88 (2008), pp. 577-593. 
 25 
                                                                                                                                                        
 33 Avner Vengosh and others, “Sources of Salinity and Boron in the Gaza Strip: Natural 
Contaminant Flow in the Southern Mediterranean Coastal Aquifer,” Water Resources Research 41, no. 1 
(2005). 
 34 Palestinian Water Authority, The Construction of the Central Sea Water Desalination Plant and the 
National Water Carrier in Gaza Strip (Ramallah: PWA, 2008). 
 35 UNDP, Utilizing Solar Energy for Drying Agriculture Crops in Khaza’a Village in the South of Gaza by 
Distributing Solar Crop Dryers for 60 Women (PAL/04/55) (Gaza City: UNDP/PAPP: Gaza City, 2005). 
http://sgp.undp.org/web/projects/7414/utilizing_solar_energy_for_drying_agriculture_crops_in_khaza
_s_village_in_the_south_of_gaza_by_distr.html (accessed March 12 2010). 
 36 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Agricultural Statistics 2004/2005 (Ramallah: PCBS,  
2006). 
 37 Mark Zeitoun, Power and Water in the Middle East: The Hidden Politics of the Palestinian-Israeli Water 
Conflict (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), pp. 126-32; Mark Zeitoun, Clemens Messerschmid, and Shaddad 
Attili, “Asymmetric Abstraction and Allocation: The Israeli-Palestinian Water Pumping Record,” Ground 
Water, 47, no. 1 (2009), pp. 149-160 at 154; World Bank, West Bank and Gaza: Assessment of Restrictions on 
Palestinian Water Sector Development Sector Note, p. 11. 
 38 Jan Selby, “Dressing up Domination as ‘Co-operation’: The Case of Israeli-Palestinian Water 
Relations,” Review of International Studies 29, no. 1 (2003), pp. 121-138. 
 39 Amer Marei, "Climate Change and its Impact on the Quantity and Quality of Groundwater 
Resources of the West Bank:" Paper presented at Climate Adaptation in MENA: Challenges and Opportunities 
workshop, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA, May 3-4, 2010. 
 40 UNDP, Climate Adaptation Strategy and Programme of Action for the Palestinian Authority, p. 34. 
 41 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Unprotected: Israeli Settler 
Violence Against Palestinian Civilians and their Property (Jerusalem: OCHA, 2008), 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_settler_vilonce_special_focus_2008_12_18.pdf 
(accessed April 7, 2010). 
 42 Julie Trottier, “A Wall, Water and Power: The Israeli ‘Separation Fence’.” Review of International 
Studies, 33, no. 1 (2007), pp. 105-127 at 121. 
 43 Food and Agriculture Organization, Assessment of Small Ruminant Breeders in Rural Hebron, Jericho, 
Bethlehem and Ramallah (Rome: FAO, 2009). 
 44 World Bank, West Bank and Gaza: Assessment of Restrictions on Palestinian Water Sector Development 
Sector Note, p. 11. 
 45 Negotiations Support Unit, The West Bank-Gaza Link: Concept Paper (Ramallah: Negotiations 
Affairs Department, Palestine Liberation Organization, 2005). 
 46 Palestinian Water Authority, Water Situation in the District of Jericho and the Jordan Valley, and Water 
Situation in the District of Nablus (Ramallah: PWA, 2008). 
 47 Sara Roy, “De-development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society Since Oslo,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies, 28, no. 3 (1999), pp. 64-82. 
 48 Office of the Chief Scientist, Preparation of Israel for Global Climate Change: The Consequences of 
Climate Change in Israel and Interim Recommendations [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Environmental 
Protection, 2008), pp. 73-74; Oli Brown and Alec Crawford, Rising Temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate 
Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict in the Middle East (Geneva: IISD, 2009), pp. 19-29, 
http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?pno=1130 (accessed March 15 2010). 
 
